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Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets  
(or Hayek’s Challenge to Habermas) 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
Abstract 
 
 For multiple reasons, deliberating groups often converge on falsehood rather than truth. 
Individual errors may be amplified rather than cured. Group members may fall victim to a bad 
cascade, either informational or reputational. Deliberators may emphasize shared information at 
the expense of uniquely held information. Finally, group polarization may lead even rational 
people to unjustified extremism. By contrast, prediction markets often produce accurate results, 
because they create strong incentives for revelation of privately held knowledge and succeed in 
aggregating widely dispersed information. The success of prediction markets offers a set of 
lessons for increasing the likelihood that groups can obtain the information that their members 
have. 
 
 
Many institutions, both public and private, make their decisions through 
deliberation. But why, exactly, is deliberation important or even desirable? A central 
answer must be that deliberation will result in wiser judgments and better outcomes. But 
does deliberation actually have this effect? The answer is by no means clear. Group 
members may impose pressures on one another, leading to a consensus on falsehood 
rather than truth. A group of like-minded people, with similar predilections, is 
particularly vulnerable to this problem. The idea of “groupthink,” coined and elaborated 
by Irving Janis, suggests the possibility that groups will tend toward uniformity and 
censorship, thus failing to combine information and enlarge the range of arguments.1 
Without structural protections, both private and public groups are likely to err, not in 
spite of deliberation but because of it.  
My aim here is to compare deliberation with an intriguing social innovation—
prediction markets—and to explore the advantages of the latter over the former in 
aggregating information. One of my goals is to see how the successes of prediction 
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1 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 7–9. 
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markets might inform the practice of deliberation. To explain why deliberation often 
fails, I investigate two sets of influences on members of deliberating groups.2 The first 
consists of informational influences, by which group members fail to disclose what they 
know out of deference to the information publicly announced by others. The second 
involves social pressures, which lead people to silence themselves in order not to face 
reputational sanctions, such as the disapproval of relevant others. As a result of these 
problems, groups often amplify rather than correct individual errors; emphasize shared 
information at the expense of unshared information; fall victim to cascade effects; and 
tend to end up in more extreme positions in line with the predeliberation tendencies of 
their members. In the United States, even federal judges are vulnerable to the relevant 
pressures, as both Republican and Democratic appointees show especially ideological 
voting when they are sitting with other judges appointed by presidents of the same 
political party.3  
Because of these pressures, deliberative processes often fail to achieve their 
minimal goal of aggregating the information actually held by the deliberators. Indeed, 
such processes often fail to aggregate information even as they decrease variance, and 
increase confidence, among their members. A confident, cohesive, error-prone group is 
nothing to celebrate. On the contrary, it might be extremely dangerous, both to itself and 
to others.4  
As we shall see, prediction markets often outperform deliberating groups, simply 
because they are so effective at pooling dispersed information among diverse people. 
Indeed, prediction markets realign private incentives in a way that makes them 
exceptionally well-designed to reduce the problems that infect deliberating groups. Such 
markets are worth investigating, in part because they provide an illuminating route by 
which to explore some characteristic defects in deliberative processes––and by which to 
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obtain insights about how they might work better. In addition, such markets are worth 
investigating in their own right, if only because they promise to provide a supplement to 
deliberation that might well improve social decisions.  
 
Deliberating Groups 
 
If deliberating groups do well, we can imagine three principal reasons:  
 
• Groups are equivalent to their best members. One or more group members 
will often know the right answer, and other members might well become 
convinced of this fact. For this reason, groups might perform toward or at the 
level of their best members. If some or many members suffer from ignorance 
or from a form of bias that leads to error, others might correct them. 
Deliberation might correct individual errors rather than propagate them, in a 
way that allows convergence on the judgment of the most accurate group 
member. 
• The whole is the sum of the parts: aggregating information. Deliberation 
could aggregate existing information in a way that leads the group as a whole 
to know more than any individual member does. Suppose that the group 
contains no experts on the question at issue, but that relevant information is 
dispersed among members so that the group is potentially expert even if its 
members are not. Or suppose that the group contains a number of experts, but 
that each member is puzzled about how to solve a particular problem. 
Deliberation might elicit the relevant information and allow the group to make 
a sensible judgment. In this process, the whole is equal to the sum of the 
parts—and the sum of the parts is what is sought.  
• Improving on majority rule. Suppose that in advance of deliberation, each 
group member is more than 50 percent likely to be right. The Condorcet Jury 
Theorem shows that the likelihood that the group’s majority will be right 
expands to 100 percent as the size of the group increases. Perhaps deliberating 
groups will do better than would the majority of their individual members 
without deliberation—whatever the initial distribution of correct answers 
within those groups. 
• The whole goes beyond the sum of the parts: synergy. The give and take of 
group discussion might sift information and perspectives in a way that leads 
the group to a good solution to a problem, one in which the whole is actually 
more than the sum of its parts. In such cases, deliberation is, at the very least, 
an ambitious form of information aggregation, one in which the exchange of 
views leads to a creative answer or solution.  
 
To what extent do these mechanisms work in practice? Two points are entirely 
clear. First, deliberation usually reduces variance.5 After talking together, group members 
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tend to come into accord with one another.6 Second, group members tend to become far 
more confident of their judgments after they speak with one another.7 A significant effect 
of group interactions is a greater sense that one’s postdeliberation conclusion is correct—
whether it actually is or not. Corroboration by others increases confidence in one’s 
judgments.8 It follows that members of deliberating groups will usually converge on a 
position on which members have a great deal of confidence. This is not disturbing if that 
position is also likely to be correct—but if it is not, then many group members will end 
up sharing a view in which they firmly believe, but which turns out to be wrong (a most 
unfortunate and sometimes quite dangerous situation). 
Unfortunately, there is no systematic evidence that deliberating groups will 
usually succeed in aggregating the information held by their members. With respect to 
questions with definite answers, deliberating groups tend to do about as well as or 
slightly better than their average members, but not as well as their best members.9 Hence, 
it is false to say that group members usually end up deferring to their internal specialists. 
Truth does not win out; the most that can be said is that under some conditions, the group 
will converge on the truth if the truth begins with “at least some initial support” within 
the group when the task has “a demonstrably correct answer.”10 Note here that when a 
group outperforms most of its individual members, it is generally because the issue is one 
on which a particular answer can be shown, to the satisfaction of all or most, to be right; 
and that even in that condition, the group might not do well if the demonstrably correct 
solution lacks significant support at the outset.  
 In general, simple majority schemes do fairly well at predicting group judgments 
for many decision tasks. It follows that if the majority is wrong, the group will be wrong 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
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Psychological Bulletin 121 (1997): 149, 161; Reid Hastie, “Experimental Evidence of Group Accuracy,” in 
Information Pooling and Group Decision Making, ed. Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen, et al. 
(Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1986), 129.  
10 Robert J. MacCoun, “Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality,” in Judgments, Decisions, and 
Public Policy, ed. Rajeev Gowda and Jeffrey Fox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 116, 
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as well.11 With experts, the same general conclusion holds. Thus a “structured approach 
for combining independent forecasts is invariably more accurate” than “traditional group 
meetings,” which do “not use information efficiently.”12 
 
Sources of Deliberative Failure 
 
For two reasons, exposure to the views of others might lead people to silence 
themselves. The first involves the informational signals provided by the acts and views of 
other people. If most group members believe that X is true, there is reason to believe that 
X is in fact true, and that reason might outweigh the purely private reason a particular 
group member has to believe that X is false. If other group members share a particular 
belief, isolated or minority members might not speak out, deferring to the informational 
signal given by the statements of others. Not surprisingly, the strength of the signal will 
depend on the number and nature of the people who are giving it. People are particularly 
averse to being sole dissenters.13 If all but one person in a deliberating group has said that 
X is true, then the remaining member is likely to agree X is true, even to the point of 
ignoring the evidence of his own senses. And if the group contains one or more people 
who are well-known to be authorities, then other group members are likely to defer to 
them. 
The second reason that group members might silence themselves involves social 
influences. Their silence might stem not from a belief that they are wrong, as in the case 
of informational pressure, but instead from the risk of social sanctions of various sorts. In 
the most extreme cases, those sanctions will take the form of criminal punishment or 
complete exclusion from the group. In less severe cases, those who defy the dominant 
position within the group will incur a form of disapproval that will lead them to be less 
trusted, liked, and respected in the future. Here, too, people are inevitably affected by the 
number and nature of those with the majority position. A large majority will impose more 
social pressure than a small one. If certain group members are leaders or authorities 
willing and able to impose social sanctions of various sorts, others will be unlikely to 
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13 See Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent. 
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defy them publicly. 
Participation in deliberative processes, and the effects of informational and social 
influences, can be put into a more general framework. Suppose that group members are 
deliberating about some factual question; suppose, too, that each member has some 
information that bears on the answer to that question. Will members disclose what they 
know?  
For each person, the answer may well depend on the individual benefits and the 
individual costs of disclosure. In many situations, and entirely apart from informational 
and social influences, the individual benefits of disclosure will be far less than the social 
benefits. In this sense, participants in deliberation often face a collective action problem, 
in which each person, following his rational self-interest, will tell the group less than it 
needs to know. At least, this is so if each member receives only a small portion of the 
benefits that come to the group from a good outcome—a plausible view about the 
situation facing many institutions, including, for example, labor unions, religious 
organizations, student and faculty groups, corporate boards, and government agencies 
If the statements of others suggest that privately held information is wrong or 
unhelpful, then the private benefit of disclosure is reduced much more. In that event, the 
group member has reason to believe that disclosure will not improve the group’s decision 
at all. Things are even worse if those who speak against the apparent consensus suffer 
reputational injury (or more). In that event, the private calculus is straightforward: 
Silence is golden.  
Both informational pressure and social influences help explain the finding that in 
a deliberating group, those in a minority position often silence themselves or otherwise 
have disproportionately little weight. There is a more particular finding: Members of low-
status groups—less-educated people, African-Americans, sometimes women—speak less 
and carry less influence within deliberating groups than their higher-status peers.14 Both 
informational influence and social pressures, likely to be especially strong for low-status 
members, contribute to this result. The unfortunate consequence can be a loss of 
information to the group as a whole, in a way that ensures that deliberating groups do far 
                                                 
14 Caryn Christenson and Ann Abbott, “Team Medical Decision Making,” in Decision Making in 
Health Care, ed. Gretchen Chapman and Frank Sonnenberg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 267, 273–76.  
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less well than they would if only they could aggregate the information held by group 
members.  
More generally, a comprehensive study has demonstrated that majority pressures 
can be powerful even for factual questions to which some people know the right 
answers.15 The study involved twelve hundred people, forming groups of six, five, and 
four members. Individuals were asked true-false questions involving art, poetry, public 
opinion, geography, economics, and politics. They were then asked to assemble into 
groups, which discussed the questions and produced answers. The majority played a 
substantial role in determining each group’s answers. The truth played a role, too, but a 
lesser one. If a majority of individuals in the group gave the right answer, the group’s 
decision moved toward the majority in 79 percent of the cases. If a majority of 
individuals in the group gave the wrong answer, the group’s decision nonetheless moved 
toward the majority in 56 percent of the cases. Hence, the truth did have an influence—
79 percent is higher than 56 percent—but the majority’s judgment was the dominant one. 
And because the majority was influential even when wrong, the average group decision 
was right only slightly more often than the average individual decision (66 percent versus 
62 percent). What is most important is that groups did not perform as well as they would 
have if they had properly aggregated the information that group members had. 
 
Habermas vs. Hayek 
 
Do these points amount to a challenge to deliberation as an ideal, or to deliberative 
conceptions of democracy? Many of those interested in deliberation have attempted to 
specify its preconditions in a way that is intended to ensure against predictable problems 
that infect real-world processes. Jürgen Habermas, for example, stresses norms and 
practices designed to allow victory by “the better argument”: 
Rational discourse is supposed to be public and inclusive, to grant equal 
communication rights for participants, to require sincerity and to diffuse any kind 
of force other than the forceless force of the better argument. This 
communicative structure is expected to create a deliberative space for the 
mobilization of the best available contributions for the most relevant topics.
16
 
                                                 
15Robert L. Thorndike, “The Effect of Discussion upon the Correctness of Group Decisions: When the 
Factor of Majority Influence Is Allowed For,” Journal of Social Psychology 9 (1938): 343.  
16See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: An Author’s Reflections, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 937, 
940 (1999).. 
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In Habermas’s “ideal speech situation,” all participants attempt to seek the truth; 
they do not behave strategically or attempt to decide; they accept a norm of equality.17 
Other advocates of deliberative democracy have spoken similarly about what appropriate 
deliberation entails.18 On this view, deliberation, properly understood, does not simply 
involve the exchange of words and opinions. It imposes its own requirements and 
preconditions. Indeed, deliberation has its own internal morality, one that operates as a 
corrective to some of the effects of deliberative processes in the real world. 
Unfortunately, preconditions of the sort identified by Habermas will cure few of the 
problems that I shall be outlining here. Those preconditions will do little to affect the key 
failures on the part of deliberating groups. Each of the failures is likely to arise even if 
discourse is public and inclusive, even if participants are sincere, and even if everyone 
has equal communication rights. We might therefore take the argument here as a 
Hayekian challenge to Habermas—a challenge that stresses (with Friedrich Hayek) the 
diffusion of information in society and the difficulty of aggregating that information 
through deliberation (as opposed to the price signal, which Hayek championed).19  
 
Consider four sets of deliberative failures. 
 
Deliberative Failure 1: Amplification of Cognitive Errors 
 
It is well known that individuals do not always process information well. They 
use heuristics that lead them to predictable errors; they are also subject to identifiable 
biases, which also produce errors.20 For example, most people follow the 
representativeness heuristic, in accordance with which judgments of probability are 
influenced by assessments of resemblance (the extent to which A “looks like” B).21 The 
representativeness heuristic helps explain what Paul Rozin and Carol Nemeroff have 
                                                 
17See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF SOCIETY 1, 2–4, 32 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979) (discussing preconditions for communication). 
18See Amy GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, Democracy and Disagreements 7–8 (1997) (outlining 
foundations of authors’ vision of deliberative democracy). 
19See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) 
(discussing dispersal of knowledge and its aggregation through markets). 
20 For an overview, see Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases: 
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
21 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” in 
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1982, 3. 
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called “sympathetic magical thinking,” including the beliefs that some objects have 
contagious properties, and that causes resemble their effects.22 The representativeness 
heuristic often works well, but it can also lead to severe blunders.  
People often err because they use the availability heuristic to answer difficult 
questions about probability. When people use the availability heuristic, they answer a 
question of probability by asking whether examples come readily to mind.23 Consider, for 
example, the question whether we should fear a hurricane, a nuclear power accident, or a 
terrorist attack. If it is easy to think of a case in which one of these hazards created 
serious harm, the assessment of probability will be greatly affected. Of course, use of the 
availability heuristic is not irrational, but it, too, can produce both excessive and 
insufficient fear. 
For purposes of assessing deliberation, a central question is whether groups avoid 
the errors of the individuals who comprise them. There is no clear evidence that they do, 
and often they do not—a vivid illustration of the principle, “garbage in, garbage out,” in a 
way that mocks the aspiration to collective correction of individual blunders. In fact, 
individual errors are not merely replicated but actually amplified in group decisions—a 
process of “some garbage in, much garbage out.” 
 Consider some key findings. If individual jurors are biased because of 
pretrial publicity that misleadingly implicates the defendant, or even because of the 
defendant’s unappealing physical appearance, juries are likely to amplify rather than 
correct those biases.24 Groups have been found to amplify, rather than to attenuate, 
reliance on the representativeness heuristic;25 to reflect even larger framing effects than 
individuals;26 to show more overconfidence than group members;27 to be more affected 
                                                 
22 Paul Rozin and Carol Nemeroff, “Sympathetic Magical Thinking: The Contagion and Similarity 
‘Heuristics,’” in Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases p. 201  
23 Tversky and Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty,” 3. 
24 MacCoun, “Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality,” 116, 121. 
25 Mark F. Stasson et al., “Group Consensus Approaches in Cognitive Bias Tasks,” Japanese 
Psychological Research 30 (1988): 68.  
26 See Norbert L. Kerr et al., “Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups,” Psychology 
Review 103 (1996): 687, 689, 691–93. 
27 Janet A. Sniezek and Rebecca A. Henry, “Accuracy and Confidence in Group Judgment,” 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 43 (1989): 1. This finding very much bears on 
excessive risk-taking, including in the context of making war. See Dominic Johnson, Overconfidence and 
War, 180–83. 
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by the biasing effect of spurious arguments from lawyers;28 to be more susceptible to the 
“sunk cost fallacy”;29 and to be more subject to choice-rank preference reversals.30 In an 
especially revealing finding, groups have been found to make more, rather than fewer, 
conjunction errors than individuals when individual error rates are high—though fewer 
when individual error rates are low.31 In addition, groups demonstrate essentially the 
same level of reliance on the availability heuristic, even when use of that heuristic leads 
to clear errors.32 
  
Deliberative Failure 2: Hidden Profiles and Common Knowledge 
 
Suppose that group members have a great deal of information—enough to 
produce the unambiguously right outcome if that information is properly aggregated. 
Even if this is so, an obvious problem is that groups will not perform well if they 
emphasize shared information and slight information that is held by one or a few 
members. Unfortunately, countless studies demonstrate that this regrettable result is 
highly likely.33 “Hidden profiles” is the term for accurate understandings that groups 
could but do not obtain. Hidden profiles are, in turn, a product of the common-knowledge 
effect, through which information held by all group members has more influence on 
group judgments than information held by only a few members.34 The most obvious 
explanation of the effect is the simple fact that as a statistical matter, common knowledge 
is more likely to be communicated to the group; but social influences play a role as well. 
Hidden Profiles. Consider a study of serious errors within working groups, both 
                                                 
28 Edward L. Schumann and W. C. Thompson, “Effects of Attorney’s **{{AU:OK, or “Attorneys’”?}} 
Arguments on Jurors’ Use of Statistical Evidence” (unpublished manuscript, 1989). 
29 Glen Whyte, “Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making,” Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 54 (1993): 430.  
30 James W. Gentry and John C. Mowen, “Investigation of the Preference Reversal Phenomenon in a 
New Product Introduction Task,” Journal of Applied Psychology 65 (1980): 715; Julie R. Irwin and James 
H. Davis, “Choice/Matching Preference Reversals in Groups,” Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 64 (1995): 325.  
31 Whyte, “Escalating Commitment,” 430.  
32 Stasson et al., “Group Consensus Processes,” **{{AU:Please check—title in earlier note is “Group 
Consensus Approaches”}} 68.  
33 Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Hidden Profiles: A Brief History,” Psychological Inquiry 14 
(2003): 304.  
34 Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, “The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing and Group 
Judgments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1993): 959.  
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face-to-face and online.35 The purpose of the study was to see how groups might 
collaborate to make personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates applying for a 
marketing manager position were placed before group members. The attributes of the 
candidates were rigged by the experimenters so that one applicant was clearly the best for 
the job described. Packets of information were given to subjects, each containing a subset 
of information from the resumes, so that each group member had only part of the relevant 
information. The groups consisted of three people, some operating face-to-face, some 
operating online. Almost none of the deliberating groups made what was conspicuously 
the right choice. The reason is simple: They failed to share information in a way that 
would permit the group to make that choice. Members tended to share positive 
information about the winning candidate and negative information about the losers. They 
suppressed negative information about the winner and positive information about the 
losers. Hence, their statements served to “reinforce the march toward group consensus 
rather than add complications and fuel debate.”36 
Or consider a simulation of political elections, in which information was parceled 
out to individual members about three candidates for political office, and in which 
properly pooled information could have led to what was clearly the best choice, candidate 
A.37 In the first condition, each member of the four-person groups was given most of the 
relevant information (66 percent of the information about each candidate). In that 
condition, 67 percent of group members favored candidate A before discussion and 85 
percent after discussion.38 This is a clear example of appropriate aggregation of 
information. Groups significantly outperformed individuals, apparently because of the 
exchange of information and reasons. Here, then, is a clear illustration of the possibility 
that groups can aggregate what members know in a way that produces sensible outcomes. 
In the second condition, by contrast, the information that favored candidate A was 
parceled out to various members of the group so that only 33 percent of information 
                                                 
35 See Ross Hightower and Lutfus Sayeed, “The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communication 
Systems on Biased Group Discussion,” Computers in Human Behavior 11 (1995): 33.  
36 Patricia Wallace, The Psychology of the Internet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
82.  
37 See Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision 
Making: Biased Information Sampling during Discussion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
48 (1985): 1467.  
38 Ibid., 1473; see also Stasser and Titus, “Hidden Profiles,” 304.  
12 
about each candidate was shared. As the condition was designed, the shared information 
favored two unambiguously inferior candidates, B and C; but if the unshared information 
emerged through discussion, and were taken seriously, candidate A would be chosen. In 
that condition, less than 25 percent of group members favored candidate A before 
discussion, a natural product of the initial distribution of information. But (and this is the 
key result) that number actually fell after discussion, simply because the shared 
information had disproportionate influence on group members.39 In other words, groups 
did worse, not better, than individuals when the key information was distributed 
selectively. In those conditions, the commonly held information was far more influential 
than the distributed information, to the detriment of the group’s ultimate decision.  
From this and many similar studies, the general conclusion is that when “the 
balance of unshared information opposes the initial most popular position . . . the 
unshared information will tend to be omitted from discussion and, therefore, will have 
little effect on members’ preferences during group discussion.”40 It follows that “group 
decisions and postgroup preferences reflect the initial preferences of group members even 
when the exchange of unshared information should have resulted in substantial shifts in 
opinion.”41 Nor does discussion increase the recall of unshared information. On the 
contrary, its major effect is to increase recall of the attributes of the initially most popular 
candidate.42 The most disturbing conclusion is that when key information is unshared, 
groups are “more likely to endorse an inferior option after discussion than [are] their 
individual members before discussion.”43 
The Common-Knowledge Effect. These results are best understood as a 
consequence of the common-knowledge effect, by which information held by all group 
members has far more influence on group judgments than information held by one 
member or a few.44 More precisely, the “influence of a particular item of information is 
directly and positively related to the number of group members who have knowledge of 
                                                 
39 Stasser and Titus, “Pooling of Unshared Information,” 1473.  
40 Ibid., 1476. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Stasser and Titus, “Hidden Profiles,” 305.  
44 See Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, “The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing and 
Group Judgments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1993): 959.  
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that item before the group discussion and judgment.”45 Under conditions of unshared 
information, group judgments have been found to be “not any more accurate than the 
average of the individual judgments, even though”—and this is the central point—the 
groups were “in possession of more information than were any of the individuals.”46  
As might be expected, the group’s focus on shared information increases with the 
size of the group.47 In a study by Stasser and colleagues designed to test judgments about 
candidates for office, involving both three-person and six-person groups, all discussions 
focused far more on shared than on unshared information—but the effect was 
significantly greater for six-person groups. Most remarkably, the researchers write, “it 
was almost as likely for a shared item to be mentioned twice as it was for an unshared 
item to be mentioned at all.”48 And despite the failures of their deliberations, group 
members were significantly more confident in their judgments after discussion.49  
 
Deliberative Failure 3: Cascades 
 
A cascade is a process by which people influence one another, so much so that 
participants ignore their private knowledge and rely instead on the publicly stated 
judgments of others. There are two kinds of cascades: informational and reputational. In 
informational cascades, people silence themselves out of deference to the information 
conveyed by others. In reputational cascades, they silence themselves so as to avoid the 
opprobrium of others. 
Informational Cascades. Hidden profiles are closely related to informational 
cascades, which greatly impair group judgments. Cascades need not involve deliberation, 
but deliberative processes often involve cascades. As in the case of hidden profiles, the 
central point is that those involved in a cascade do not reveal what they know. As a 
result, the group does not obtain important information. 
To see how informational cascades work, imagine a deliberating group that is 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 960.  
46 Ibid., 973.  
47 See Garold Stasser et al., “Information Sampling in Structured and Unstructured Discussions of 
Three and Six-Person Groups,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 (1989): 67.  
48 Ibid., 78. 
49 Ibid., 72.  
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deciding whether to authorize some new venture.50 Let us also assume that the jurors are 
announcing their views in sequence, in a temporal queue, and that each member knows 
his place in that queue. Every member has some private information about what should 
be done. But each also attends, reasonably enough, to the judgments of others. Mr. 
Andrews is the first to speak. He suggests that the venture should be authorized. Ms. 
Barnes now knows Andrews’s judgment; it is clear that she, too, should vote in favor of 
the venture if she agrees independently with Andrews. But if her independent judgment is 
otherwise, she would—if she trusts Andrews no more and no less than she trusts 
herself—be indifferent about what to do and might simply flip a coin.  
Now turn to a third juror, Mr. Carlton. Suppose that both Andrews and Barnes 
have argued in favor of the venture but that Carlton’s own information, though 
inconclusive, suggests that the venture is a terrible idea. In that event, Carlton might well 
ignore what he knows and follow Andrews and Barnes. It is likely in these circumstances 
that both Andrews and Barnes had reasons for their conclusion, and unless Carlton thinks 
that his own information is better than theirs, he should follow their lead. If he does, 
Carlton is in a cascade. Now suppose that Carlton is acting in response to what Andrews 
and Barnes did, not on the basis of his own information, and that subsequent members 
know what Andrews, Barnes, and Carlton did. On reasonable assumptions, they will do 
exactly what Carlton did: favor the venture regardless of their private information (which, 
we are supposing, is relevant but inconclusive). This will happen even if Andrews 
initially blundered.51  
If this is what is happening, there is a serious social problem: Those who are in 
the cascade do not disclose the information that they privately hold. In the example just 
given, decisions will not reflect the overall knowledge, or the aggregate knowledge, of 
those in the group—even if the information held by individual members, if actually 
revealed and aggregated, would produce a quite different result. The reason is that people 
are following the lead of those who came before. Subsequent speakers might fail to rely 
on, and fail to reveal, private information that actually exceeds the information 
                                                 
50 I draw here on David Hirschleifer, “The Blind Leading the Blind,” in The New Economics of Human 
Behavior, ed. Marianno Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
188, 193–94.  
51 Ibid., 195. 
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collectively held by those who started the cascade.  
Cascades often occur in the real world within deliberating groups or elsewhere;52 
they are easy to create in the laboratory. The simplest experiment asked subjects to guess 
whether the experiment was using urn A, which contained two red balls and one white, or 
urn B, which contained two white balls and one red.53 Subjects could earn $2.00 for a 
correct decision, and hence an economic incentive favored correct individual decisions (a 
point to which I will return). In each period, the contents of the chosen urn were emptied 
into a container. A randomly selected subject was asked to make one (and only one) 
private draw of a ball in each round. The subject recorded the color of that draw on an 
answer sheet and his own decision about which urn was involved. The subject did not 
announce his draw to the group, but he did announce his own decision to everyone. Then 
the urn was passed to the next subject for his own private draw, which again was not 
disclosed, and his own decision about the urn, which again was disclosed. This process 
continued until all subjects had made draws and decisions. At that time, the experimenter 
announced the actual urn used. If the subject had picked the urn only on the basis of his 
private information, he would have been right 66.7 percent of the time. The point of the 
experiment was to see whether people will decide to ignore their own draw in the face of 
conflicting announcements by predecessors—and to explore whether such decisions will 
lead to cascades and errors. 
In the experiment, cascades often developed and often produced errors. After a 
number of individual judgments were revealed, people sometimes announced decisions 
that were inconsistent with their private draws, but that fit with the majority of previous 
announcements.54 More than 77 percent of “rounds” resulted in cascades, and 15 percent 
of private announcements did not reveal a “private signal,” that is, the information 
provided by people’s own draws. Consider cases in which one person’s draw (say, red) 
contradicted the announcement of his predecessor (say, urn B). In such cases, the second 
announcement nonetheless matched the first about 11 percent of the time—far less than a 
                                                 
52 See ibid; also see Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent. .  
53 See Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt, “Information Cascades in the Laboratory,” American 
Economic Review 87 (1997): 847.  
54 See Angela Hung and Charles Plott, “Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to 
Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions,” American Economic Review 91 (2001): 1508, 
1515.  
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majority, but enough to ensure cascades. And when one person’s draw contradicted the 
announcement of two or more predecessors, the second announcement was likely to 
follow those who went before. Of note, the majority of decisions were rationally based on 
the available information55—but erroneous cascades nonetheless developed. Table 4-1 
shows an example of a cascade that produced an inaccurate outcome (the urn used was 
B):56 
 
Table 4-1. An Informational Cascade 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Private Draw a A a b b b 
Decision A A A A A A 
Source: Willinger and Ziegelmeyet, “Are More Informed Agents,” 291. 
 
What is noteworthy here, of course, is that the total amount of private information 
—four whites and two reds—justified the correct judgment, which was in favor of urn B. 
But the existence of two early signals, producing rational but incorrect judgments, led 
everyone else to fall in line. “Initial misrepresentative signals start a chain of incorrect 
decisions that is not broken by more representative signals received later.”57 This result 
maps directly onto real-world decisions by deliberating groups, in which people fail to 
disclose what they know, to the detriment of the group as a whole. 
Reputational Cascades. In a reputational cascade, people think they know what 
is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in 
order to maintain the good opinion of others. Suppose Albert suggests that global 
warming is a serious problem and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she 
actually thinks that Albert is right, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, 
ignorant or indifferent to environmental protection. If Albert and Barbara seem to agree 
that global warming is a serious problem, Cynthia not only might not contradict them 
publicly, but also might even appear to share their judgment, not because she believes 
that judgment to be correct, but because she does not want to face their hostility or lose 
                                                 
55 Thus, 72 percent of subjects followed Bayes’s rule in Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt, “Information 
Cascades in the Laboratory,” American Economic Review 87 (1997): 847, and 64 percent in Marc Willinger 
and Anthony Ziegelmeyet, “Are More Informed Agents Able to Shatter Information Cascades in the Lab?” 
in The Economics of Networks: Interaction and Behaviours, ed. Patrick Cohendet et al. (New York: 
Springer, 1998), 291, 304. 
56 See Willinger and Ziegelmeyet, “Are More Informed Agents,” 291. 
57 See Anderson and Holt, “Information Cascades in the Laboratory,” 847.  
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their good opinion.  
It should be easy to see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert, 
Barbara, and Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might be most 
reluctant to contradict them, even if he thinks they are wrong. In the actual world of 
group decisions, people are, of course, uncertain whether publicly expressed statements 
are a product of independent information, participation in an informational cascade, or 
reputational pressure. Much of the time, listeners and observers undoubtedly overstate the 
extent to which the actions of others are based on independent information. 
The possibility of reputational cascades is demonstrated by an ingenious variation 
on the urn experiment mentioned above.58 In this experiment, people were paid $0.25 for 
a correct decision, but $0.75 for a decision that matched the decision of the majority of 
the group. There were punishments for incorrect and nonconforming answers as well. If 
people made an incorrect decision, they lost $0.25; if their decision failed to match the 
group’s decision, they lost $0.75.  
In this experiment, cascades appeared almost all of the time. No fewer than 96.7 
percent of rounds resulted in cascades, and 35.3 percent of people’s announcements did 
not match their private signal, that is, the signal given by their own draw. And when the 
draw of a subsequent person contradicted the announcement of the predecessor, 72.2 
percent of people matched the first announcement. Consider, as a dramatic illustration, 
table 4-2, which shows this period of the experiment (the actual urn was B):59  
 
Table 4-2. Conformity and Cascades 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Private Draw a b b b a b b b a B 
Decision A A A A A A A A A A 
Source: Hung and Plott, “Information Cascades.” 
 
This experiment shows that especially unfortunate results should be expected if 
people are rewarded not only or not mostly for being correct, but also or mostly for doing 
what other people do. The problem is that people are not revealing the information they 
actually have. 
 
                                                 
58 See Hung and Plott, “Information Cascades,” 1515–17.  
59 Ibid., 1516. 
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Deliberative Failure 4: Group Polarization 
 
There are clear links among hidden profiles, social cascades, and the well-
established phenomenon of group polarization, by which members of a deliberating 
group end up adopting a more extreme version of the position toward which they tended 
before deliberation began.60 The problem is especially severe for groups of like-minded 
people, who typically end up in more extreme positions as a result of deliberation. Group 
polarization is the typical pattern with deliberating groups, and it has been found in 
hundreds of studies involving more than a dozen countries, including the United States, 
France, Afghanistan, and Germany.61 For example, those who disapprove of the United 
States and are suspicious of its intentions will increase their disapproval and suspicion if 
they exchange points of view. Indeed, there is specific evidence of the latter phenomenon 
among citizens of France.62  
Group polarization occurs for matters of fact as well as issues of value, though it 
is easier to demonstrate the latter. If the question is whether a terrorist attack will occur in 
the United States in the next year, group polarization will not be easy to test, simply 
because the answer is either yes or no, and it is not simple to demonstrate greater 
extremism in binary choices. But suppose that people are asked, on a bounded scale of 
zero to eight, how likely it is that a terrorist attack will occur in the United States in the 
next year, with zero indicating “zero probability,” eight indicating “absolutely certain,” 
seven indicating “overwhelmingly likely,” six “more probable than not,” and five “fifty-
fifty.” In that event, the answers from a deliberating group will tend to reveal group 
polarization, as people move toward more extreme points on the scale depending on their 
initial median point. If the predeliberation median is five, the group judgment will usually 
be six; if the predeliberation median is three, the group judgment will usually be two.63 
Recall here that federal judges are highly susceptible to group polarization, as both 
Democratic and Republican appointees show far more ideological voting patterns when 
sitting with other judges appointed by a president of the same political party.64 Juries 
                                                 
60 Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (New York, N.Y.: Free Press, 1986), 206–7.  
61 Ibid., 204. 
62 Ibid., 224. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, “Ideological Voting,” 301.  
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polarize as well.65 
Why does group polarization occur? There are three reasons.66 The first and most 
important involves the now-familiar idea of informational influence, but in a distinctive 
form. People respond to the arguments made by other people—and the “argument pool” 
in any group with some predisposition in one direction will inevitably be skewed toward 
that predisposition. As a statistical matter, the arguments favoring the initial position will 
be more numerous than those pointing in the other direction. Individuals will have heard 
of some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge from group deliberation. As a result of 
the relevant arguments, deliberation will lead people toward a more extreme point in line 
with what group members initially believed.  
The second explanation involves social influences. People want to be perceived 
favorably by other group members. Sometimes people’s publicly stated views are, to a 
greater or lesser extent, a function of how they want to present themselves. Once they 
hear what others believe, some will adjust their positions at least slightly in the direction 
of the dominant position in order to hold onto their preserved self-presentation. They shift 
accordingly.67  
The third explanation stresses that people with extreme views tend to have more 
confidence that they are right, and that, as people gain confidence, they become more 
extreme in their beliefs.68 In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people’s opinions 
have been shown to become more extreme simply because their views have been 
corroborated and because they have been more confident after learning of the shared 
views of others.69 
Note that if it is understood in these terms, group polarization may well reflect 
rational behavior at the individual level.70 Suppose that each group member privately 
assigns a significant probability, say of 0.6, to the truth of some hypothesis (say, that 
                                                 
65 See David Schkade et al., “Deliberating about Dollars: The Severity Shift,” Columbia Law Review 
100 (2000): 101.  
66 Brown, Social Psychology, 200–45. 
67 Ibid. It has similarly been suggested that majorities are especially potent because people do not want 
to incur the wrath, or lose the favor, of large numbers of others, and that when minorities have influence, it 
is because they produce genuine attitudinal change. See Baron et al., “Social Corroboration,” 82.  
68 Baron et al., “Social Corroboration,” 537.  
69 Ibid. 
70 I am grateful to Christian List for pressing this point; he should not be held responsible for my 
restatement of it here. 
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North Korea will have nuclear weapons within the next year). Suppose, further, that 
group discussion leads each group member to hear evidence largely supportive of the 
hypothesis, leading to a judgment in favor of a higher probability, say of 0.7. Rational 
updating may be entirely responsible for the shift. Now suppose all group members report 
after deliberation that they have each independently arrived at a probability of 0.7 for the 
truth of the hypothesis, based on the evidence they have received (and starting with a 
prior of 0.6). What this means is that there have been a total number of n independent 
items of evidence in support of the hypothesis (one such item foreach of n group 
members), each of which has been sufficiently strong to support a Bayesian update from 
0.6 to 0.7. The existence of these n independent items of evidence should then lead the 
group as a whole—and each group member post-deliberation—to assign a still higher 
posterior probability to the hypothesis, i.e., a probability well above 0.7.  
Whether rational updating of this kind will produce accurate or inaccurate 
judgments depends on the antecedently held information within the group. Suppose that 
for people who are fully informed, the probability that the relevant hypothesis is true is in 
fact 0.3. If the group starts from a significantly inflated probability estimate, group 
polarization will lead them to make severe errors. Nothing in the phenomenon of group 
polarization demonstrates that deliberation will lead to blunders. But if the median 
predeliberation view is wrong, groups are likely to do worse than their individual 
members. 
It should be clear that the four sources of deliberative failure can create serious 
problems for deliberating groups. What might be done in response? I have mentioned 
Hayek’s suggestion that the price mechanism is an excellent way to aggregate dispersed 
information. Might the price system be enlisted as a supplement to, or even a replacement 
for, social deliberation? 
 
Prediction Markets 
 
Deliberation is one way to aggregate privately held information, but there are 
many other possibilities. An obvious alternative is to rely on the price signal, which has a 
similar aggregative function. As Hayek emphasized, the price mechanism is a kind of 
“marvel,” because it combines widely dispersed information held by diverse people. And 
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if an emphasis is placed on the information-aggregating properties of markets, it would 
seem plain that, to improve on the answer produced by deliberating groups, we might 
consider an increasingly popular possibility: Create a market.71 Prediction markets, a 
recent innovation, have proved remarkably successful at forecasting future events; they 
seem to do far better, in many domains, than deliberating groups. Such markets are worth 
sustained attention, in part because they offer important lessons about how to make 
deliberation go better or worse, and in part because they provide a useful model for many 
private and public organizations. 
Potential and Promise. A central advantage of prediction markets is that they 
impose the right incentives for diverse people to disclose the information they separately 
hold. Recall that in a deliberating group, members often have little incentive to say what 
they know. By speaking out, they provide benefits to others while possibly facing high 
private costs. Prediction markets realign incentives in a way that is precisely designed to 
overcome these problems. Because investments in such markets are generally not 
disclosed to the public, investors need not fear reputational sanctions if, for example, they 
have predicted that a company’s sales will be low or that a certain candidate will be 
elected president. And because people stand to gain or lose from their investments, they 
have a strong incentive to use (and in that sense to disclose) whatever private information 
they hold; they can capture, rather than give to others, the benefits of disclosure. The use 
of private information will be reflected in the price signal. In these crucial ways, the 
problems that infect deliberating groups are largely eliminated in prediction markets.  
Prediction markets also impose strong incentives for traders to ferret out accurate 
information. Traders do not trade blindly, and they are entirely able to stop trading, for a 
moment or more, in order to retrieve better information that will give them an advantage. 
In many deliberating groups, by contrast, participants cannot leave; they must continue 
deliberating, and the necessary information is, at best, dispersed and locked within 
individual participants. Well-functioning systems of deliberation encourage group 
members to act dynamically to acquire further information, just as markets do.  
                                                 
71 For valuable overviews, see Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, “Prediction Markets,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 18 (2004): 107; Michael Abramowicz, “Information Markets, Administrative 
Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis,” University of Chicago Law Review 71 (2004): 
933; Saul Levmore, “Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation,” Journal of Corporation Law 
28 (2003): 589.  
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Of course, investors, like everyone else, are subject to the informational pressure 
imposed by the views of others. But a market creates strong incentives for revelation of 
whatever information people actually hold. And indeed, prediction markets have been 
found not to amplify individual errors but to eliminate them; the prices that result from 
trading prove reliable even if many individual traders err. In recent years, prediction 
markets have done more than to provide valuable information. In countless domains, their 
forecasts have proved extremely accurate.72 The most dramatic finding is that prices 
generally operate as probabilities. When prices suggest that events are likely to occur 
with 90 percent probability, they occur 90 percent of the time; when the price suggest a 
probability of 80 percent, the events happen 80 percent of the time; and so forth.  
Since 1988, the University of Iowa has run the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), 
which allow people to bet on the outcome of presidential elections. Before the 2004 
elections, they did far better than professional polling organizations, outperforming polls 
451 out of 596 times.73 In the week before the four elections from 1988 to 2000, the 
predictions in the Iowa market showed an average absolute error of just 1.5 percentage 
points—a significant improvement over the 2.1 percentage point error in the final Gallup 
polls. In 2004, the Iowa market did even better. On midnight of November 1, it showed 
Bush with 50.45% of the vote and Kerry with 49.55%—very close to the final numbers 
of 51.56% for Bush and 48.44% for Kerry.  
Prediction markets, aggregating diverse views, are flourishing in numerous 
domains. Consider the Hollywood Stock Exchange, in which people predict (among other 
things) Oscar nominees and winners as well as opening weekend box office figures. The 
level of accuracy has been extremely impressive, especially in view of the fact that the 
traders use virtual rather than real money. Among the most impressive achievements of 
the Hollywoos Stock exchange to date is its uncanny accuracy in predicting Oscar 
winners, with correct judgments in fifteen of the sixteen the categories for which trading 
                                                 
72 For early overviews, see David M. Pennock et al., The Real Power of Artificial Markets, 291 
Science 987 (2001); David M. Pennock et al., The Power of Play: Efficiency and Forecast Accuracy in 
Web Market Games, NEC Research Institute Technical Report 1000-168 (2001). A wealth of valuable 
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73See Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Harnessing the Power of Information: A New Approach to 
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was allowed in the last two years. The markets for the demand for gas outperform the 
experts on the demand for gas.74 Many people believe that “you can’t predict the 
weather,” but the National Weather Service does quite well, and Orange Juice futures do 
even better.75 A large prediction market focuses on the likelihood that economic data 
released later in the week will show specific values;76 the market has performed even 
better than the consensus forecasts of a survey of about fifty professional forecasters.  
Many companies are now using prediction markets to aggregate diverse views. 
Hewlett Packard (HP) and the California Institute of Technology initiated a project to 
study prediction markets as an information aggregation mechanism involving product 
sales.77 In no fewer than six of the eight markets for which official forecasts were 
available, the market prediction was significantly closer to the actual outcome than the 
official forecast. For its part, Google has created a large set of prediction markets to help 
to forecast its own development.78 The relevant markets predict launch dates for products, 
new office openings, and a range of other outcomes of importance to the company. The 
outcomes have been exceedingly accurate; prices have actually represented probabilities. 
Dispersed knowledge within the company has been accurately aggregated in this way. 
Many other companies, including Ely Lilly and Microsoft, have used prediction markets 
as well to supplement deliberation about future courses of action. 
To be sure, prediction markets themselves involve a measure of deliberation. 
Many individual investors are likely to have deliberated with others before they invest. In 
some such markets, investors undoubtedly act as “teams,” pooling resources after 
deliberating together about what to do. The point is that decisions ultimately come not 
from asking group members to come up with a mutually agreeable conclusion, but by 
reference to the price signal, which will have aggregated a great deal of diverse 
information. It is for this reason that prediction markets outperform deliberative 
                                                 
74 See Robin Hanson, Designing Real Terrorism Futures, supra note, at 2. 
75Richard Roll, Orange Juice and Weather, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 861, 871 (1984). 
76See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 207, at 113–14. 
77See Kay-Yut Chen & Charles R. Plott, Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept, Design, and 
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processes. 
Strategy, Manipulation, and Limitations. It is natural to wonder about whether 
and when prediction markets might fail. Some clues are provided by two conspicuous 
failures. Such markets found it more probable than not that Special Prosecutor Patrick 
Fitzgerald would indict White House adviser Karl Rove in 2005, and they found it 
exceedingly improbable that President George W. Bush would appoint John Roberts to 
the United States Supreme Court. The best explanation is that there was not a great deal 
of dispersed information about the particular decisions of Special Prosecutor Fitzgerald 
or President Bush. To be sure, investors knew that Fitzgerald would not indict Bush 
himself and that President Bush would not appoint Fitzgerald (or Tony Blair, Saddam 
Hussein, or John Kerry) to the Supreme Court; but they lacked the kind of information 
that would permit successful judgments about the probability that a particular movie 
would win the Oscars, or that a particular product would do well in the market, or that a 
particular candidate would be elected in a contested race. 
There is an additional problem. Suppose that investors know that their “bets” 
might have a significant impact on the hypothesis that the market is supposed to predict. 
Investors might believe, for example, that the predictions of the Iowa Electronic Markets 
will affect the outcomes of political campaigns, by making certain candidates look 
promising or instead doomed. Such investors might pour immense sums of money into 
bets on their preferred candidates, and in the process hope to create a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. This danger seems nonexistent for genuinely exogenous events, such as a 
natural disaster or an unusual weather pattern. But for economic events, political 
campaigns, product success, and terrorism, the risk of manipulation cannot be ruled out 
of bounds. 
Existing evidence does suggest that the risk may be more hypothetical than real. 
Several efforts to manipulate election markets have been made, and they have not 
succeeded: In a short time, canny investors see that prices are inflated or deflated, and the 
price rapidly returns to normal. More experience is required to know whether 
manipulation will work in other contexts. 
Feasibility, Markets, and Deliberation Once More. I have suggested that 
prediction markets face a pervasive problem of feasibility. A deliberating jury, for 
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example, could not enlist such markets to decide on questions of guilt or innocence. 
Among other things, there is no objective way to test whether the jury, or individual 
jurors, ended up with the right answer (and if there were, the jury might well be 
dispensable). More generally, it is not easy to see how prediction markets could be used 
on normative questions. At most, such markets could be used on the factual questions that 
are sometimes part of such questions. 
There is another problem. When the relevant groups are small, effective markets 
may be impossible to create, simply because of the absence of sufficient numbers of 
investors. A certain number is necessary to ensure that prediction markets have enough 
information to aggregate. Nonetheless, government agencies might well enlist such 
markets to resolve a number of questions, and ambitious efforts are underway to examine 
how government might enlist them to answer an array of disputed questions.79  
In fact governments might use prediction markets to help make projections about 
insolvency, budget deficits, and the costs and benefits of proposed regulations.80 In each 
of these cases, the predictions of prediction markets might provide a “reality check” for 
deliberative processes. Officials might take into account the markets’ predictions of the 
anticipated damage from a natural disaster, the number of annual deaths from an actual or 
anticipated disease (such as mad cow disease or AIDS), the number of American 
casualties from a war effort, the existence of demonstrable harms from global warming 
by, say, 2010, the likelihood of scarcity of natural resources, shrinkage of tropical forests 
in the world, demonstrable deterrent effects from capital punishment or other severe 
punishments, increases or decreases in emissions of specified air pollutants, increases or 
decreases in concentrations of air pollution in the ambient air, and much more. In all 
these cases, private or public institutions might create markets to provide information on 
crucial questions, and public institutions might take that information into account in 
making judgments about policy. 
The broadest point is that, even when prediction markets are not feasible, an 
understanding of their virtues helps illuminate the virtues and vices of deliberation—and 
helps show how to obtain more of the former and less of the latter. Such markets 
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overcome the collective action problem from which deliberating groups suffer; they also 
give people a strong incentive to say what they know and to back their best-grounded 
convictions with money. It should be possible for deliberating groups to learn from the 
successes of markets, above all by encouraging their members to disclose their privately 
held information. When such groups do poorly, it is often because they fail to elicit the 
information that their members have. Good norms, and good incentives, can go a long 
way toward reducing this problem. Consider here a fundamental redefinition of what it 
means to be a “team player.” Frequently a team player is thought to be someone who 
does not upset the group’s consensus. But it would be possible, and a great deal better, to 
understand team players as those who increase the likelihood that the team will be right—
if necessary, by disrupting the conventional wisdom.  
The point applies to many organizations, including corporate boards. In the 
United States, the highest-performing companies tend to have “extremely contentious 
boards that regard dissent as an obligation” and that “have a good fight now and then.”81 
Investment clubs have little dissent, and lose a great deal of money, when members are 
united by close social ties.82 By contrast, the best-performing investment clubs lack such 
ties and benefit from dissent and epistemic diversity. When deliberating groups do badly, 
fear of social sanctions is often a major reason. When they do well, they resemble 
prediction markets in the sense that their members have a strong incentive to disclose 
their private information.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Groups often hold a great deal of information, and an important task is to elicit and use 
the information of their members. Deliberation is generally thought to be the best way of 
carrying out that task, but deliberative bodies are subject to serious problems. Much of 
the time, informational influences and social pressures lead members not to say what they 
know. As a consequence, groups tend to propagate and even amplify cognitive errors. 
They also emphasize shared information at the expense of unshared information, 
resulting in hidden profiles. Cascade effects and group polarization are common. 
                                                 
81 See Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, Harvard Business Review (Sept. 2002). 
82 See Brooke Harrington, Pop Finance: Investment Clubs and the New Ownership Society (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006, forthcoming). 
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Prediction markets have significant advantages over deliberative processes, and in 
many contexts they might supplement or even replace those processes. Such markets tend 
to correct rather than amplify individual errors, above all because they allow shrewd 
investors to take advantage of the mistakes made by others. By providing economic 
rewards for correct individual answers, they encourage investors to disclose the 
information they have. As a result, they are often more accurate than the judgments of 
deliberating groups. To the extent feasible, many groups would often do well to enlist 
prediction markets in arriving at their judgments, above all because of the accuracy of the 
price signal. Much more broadly, deliberating groups might attempt to counteract the 
pressures I have explored, learning from the successes of prediction markets to reduce the 
risks of deliberative failure. 
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